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ADMIRALTY-JURiSDICTIoN-PuBLIC VESSEL OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT ENGAXD
IN TADE.-The plaintiff, the owner of certain cargo alleged to have been
damaged by the charterer of the carrying vessel, on a voyage from Montevideo,
Uruguay, to New York, sued out a libel in New York against the vessel. She
was owned by the Chilean government, but was chartered by that government to
a private charterer for commercial purposes. In the charter-party, it was pro-
vided that an officer of the Chilean navy was to remain in command, and that
the Chilean government reserved certain cargo space; it was also alleged that
the return cargo was to be carried for the Chilean government. Held, that the
vessel was immune from process, being a public vessel of a foreign government.
The Maipo (i918, S. D. N. Y.), 252 Fed. 627.
This is the first time the American courts have had to deal with the immunity
from process of a public vessel not operated wholly by the government but by
a private charterer and engaged entirely in trade. In the leading British case
on the subject, the vessel was owned by the King of Belgium, was in entire
charge of government officers, and carried the mails as well as private cargo,
and it was held that the subordinate use of the vessel for carrying merchandise
did not deprive her of her privilege as a public vessel. The Parlement Beige
(188o) 5 P. D. x97. Lord Justices James, Baggallay and Brett intimated that
to bring a public vessel within the local jurisdiction "it must be maintained
. . . that the ship has been so used as to have been employed substantially
as a mere trading ship and not substantially for national purposes." But the
force of that qualifying distinction is much weakened by the fact that the asser-
tion by the foreign government that it is a public vessel in its control cannot be
questioned by the court of the forum. If the vessel were not in government
control or declared so to be, the inference is that the immunity from local
jurisdiction might be lost. In the instant case, Judge Mayer emphasized the
factors that the government had possession and control of the vessel by its
naval officer and that the vessel was used for a public purpose in the emer-
gency of this war to enable the Chilean shippers to export and import by a
government vessel. In view of the increasing degree of governmental partici-
pation in the business of transportation, the question will soon arise whether
the immunity from jurisdiction extended to public vessels should not be with-
drawn from vessels owned by a government but chartered to private charterers,
entirely in their control and wholly engaged in commercial enterprises. See
(1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, I082. The problem will become delicate if the
foreign government under such circumstances should assert the immunity of
the vessel.
BILLS AND NOTES-IRREGULAR INDORSER.-PAROL EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE
UNDER N. I. L.-A negotiable promissory note signed by a church corporation
as maker and payable to the plaintiff's order was before delivery signed in blank
by the defendants. The note was not paid at maturity and was duly protested.
The defendants offered evidence to show that at the time the note was delivered
it was agreed between the plaintiff and the defendants that they were not to
be liable to him. Held, that under the Negotiable Instruments Law, sees. 63
and 64, the liability of the defendants was absolutely fixed as that of indorsers.
Cramer v. West Bay City Sugar Co. (x918, Mich.) 167 N. W. 843.
[187]
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Prior to the adoption of the N. I. L. the greatest confusion existed in the cases
dealing with the irregular indorser. The English courts apparently held him
not liable at'all. Steele v. McKinlay (i88o) L. R. 5 A. C. 754- In some Amer-
ican states he was held to be "presumptively" a joint maker; but there was
no agreement whether the "presumption" was "conclusive' or "merely prima
facie!" In others he was presumed to be a guarantor. Other states had still
different rules. See note to Cromwell v. Hewitt (i869) 4o N. Y. 491; also
Norton, Bills and Notes (4th ed.) i88-i89. The N. I. L. provides as follows:
"Sec. 63. A person placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise than
as maker, drawer or acceptor, is deemed to be an indorser, unless he clearly
indicates by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some other capacity."
"Sec. 64. Where a person, not otherwise a party to an instrument, places thereon
his signature in blank before delivery, he is liable as indorser, in accordance with
the following rules: I. If the instrument is payable to the order of a third
person, he is liable to the payee and to all subsequent parties. 2. If the instru-
ment is payable to the order of the maker or drawer, or is payable to bearer,
he is liable to all parties subsequent to the maker or drawer. 3. If he signs
for the accommodation of the payee, he is liable to all parties subsequent to
the payee." This language seems clear enough in all reason, but the expected
complete uniformity has not resulted. However, a large majority of the states
which have passed upon the subject have agreed in reaching the result arrived
at in the principal case, viz., that oral agreements of the parties are irrelevant
in determining the liability of the irregular indorser. Unfortunately, at least
so far as uniformity is concerned, the New York Court of Appeals has taken
the view that these provisions of the N. I. L. do nothing more than create
"presumptions" as to the obligations of the irregular indorser-the presumptions
differing as to details from those which existed before the act was passed.
Thus the door is still open in New York for evidence as to the actual agreement
of the original parties. Haddock, Blanchard & Co. v. Haddock (i9o8) 192 N. Y.
499, 85 N. E. 68. One or two other states have taken a similar view. Hunter
v. Harris (z91z) 63 Or. 505, 127 Pac. 786; Mercantile Bank of Memphis v.
Busby (igo8) 12o Tenn. 652, 113 S. W. 39o. The English Bills of Exchange
Act is regarded as making the irregular indorser liable to the payee as an indorser,
Glenie v. Bruce Smith [i9o8] I K. B. 263. So far as abstract justice is con-
cerned much may be said for the view taken by the New York courts; however,
it is hard to justify it in view of the clear language of the statute. It also fails
to carry out the plan to secure uniformity in commercial law. Moreover, the
statutory provision itself, as applied to the case in hand, may well be justified as
a practical rule, on the ground that in most cases the real agreement of the
parties is that the irregular indorser shall be liable to the payee, and that
whatever injustice may be done in the few cases where this is not so is more
than counterbalanced by the opportunities which the permission to introduce
extrinsic evidence gives to dishonest defendants to escape from the results of
their agreements. To this may be added the saving of time and expense, both
to the litigants and the public, by the elimination of a trial of the issues raised
by the extrinsic evidence if it be admitted.
CoNFLirC OF LAws-HEm's CoMPuLsoRY PORTION-RIGHTS OF ITALIAN Hus-
BAND IN WiFE's PROPERTY IN FRANcx.-The wife of an Italian subject, who had
acquired a domicil de facto in France, left all of her property by will to her
mother. Her husband brought an action in France against his mother-in-law
for the recovery of a life-estate in one-third of the wife's property in France,
basing his claim upon the provisions of the Italian Code relating to the heir's
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compulsory portion. Held, (I) that his contention was not well-founded with
respect to the immovable property, inasmuch as the rights therein were controlled
by the law of the situs and the French law did not confer upon the surviving
husband or wife a right to a compulsory portion; and (2) that he was entitled
to the enjoyment during his life of one-third of the wife's movable property
in accordance with the provisions of the Italian law. Tisserand v. Pellegrino
(1917, Tribunal civil de Nice) 44 CLuxNr, 1792.
See COMMENTS, p. i8I.
CoNFLIrT OF LAws-WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION Acr-ExRATERIToWAL
INjuR.-An employer doing a general contracting business in the Northwest,
but with general offices in Minnesota, made in that state a contract with a work-
man to go to another state to work. While so employed the workman was
killed by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. His
dependents in Minnesota claimed compensation in that state under the state
Compensation Act. Held, that the claimants were entitled to recover under the
Minnesota law. State ex rel. Maryland, etc., Co. v. District Court (19x8, Minn.)
x68 N. W. 177.
The decision is placed by the court upon the ground that the Minnesota act
was intended to compensate for injuries, whether intraterritorial or extraterri-
torial, incurred as incidental to a business "localized in the state." For a dis-
cussion of the problems involved in this and similar cases, see (1917) 27 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 113; (x9x8) 27 ibid. 707.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw.-CLASS LEGISLATION-STERILIZATION OF THE MENTALLY
DEFEnCri IN STATE INsITUTIONs.A Michigan statute authorized the manage-
ment of any publicly maintained institution for the insane and feeble-minded
to render incapable of procreation any individual confined there who had been
adjudicated by the proper court to be a proper subject for such treatment. The
superintendent of an institution applied for a writ of mandamus to compel such
adjudication in respect of an inmate of his institution. Held, that the statute
was unconstitutiohal as denying equal protection of the laws, and that no writ
should issue. Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge (Ig18, Mich.) i66 N. W. 938.
The prevention of procreation by criminals and imbeciles has been advocated
for some time by scientists and societies. See 27 MEDico-LEGAL JouR. I34;
Warner, American Charities, 133 f. Whatever may be said of the operation as
a punishment for crime,-on which see Baldwin, Whipping and Castration as
Punishments for Crime (1899) 8 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 371, 380ff.; State v.
Feilen (1912) 70 Wash. 65, 126 Pac. 75, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 418 and iote; and
COMMENTs (r914) 23 YA.LE LAW JouRNAL, 363-the use of some such operation
to prevent the propagation of imbeciles is highly desirable. For imbecility is an
inheritable trait. Lombroso, Crime: Its Causes and Remedies, sec. 74; Pro-
ceedings of National Conference of Charities and Correction (19o3) 245-253.
And the mentally defective have a peculiar bent toward uncontrolled procreation.
Proceedings of National Conference of Charities and Correction (I9o2) 154.
To meet this statutes have been passed making it a crime-in substance--to
obtain carnal knowledge of an imbecile, epileptic, etc., of the opposite sex, within
the period of fecundity. (Ind.) Burns' Ann. St. 1914, secs. 225o, 2251. Excep-
tion is made in favor of husband or wife; but the issuance of a marriage
license to persons of the restricted class is prohibited. Ibid. sec. 8365; but see
Franklin v. Lee '0902) 30 Ind. App. 3, 62 N. E. 78. There seems to be no
question as to the constitutionality of such statutes, nor as to their beneficial
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effect. The only question is as to their adequacy. Some states have attempted
to catch the evil at the source, passing statutes providing for the sterilization
of inmates of public institutions. Conn. Pub. Laws i9og, ch. 2og; (Ind.) Burns'
Ann. St. 1914, sec. 2232. Such legislation has in some cases been held uncon-
stitutional as hopelessly unreasonable in its classification. The argument is that
the sub-class, the defectives-in-public-institutions, who are the only ones deprived
of their liberty of procreation, are of all the defectives the last to require such
deprivation: being under surveillance, and without access to the opposite sex.
Sinith v. Board of Examiners (913, Sup. Ct.) 85 N. J. L. 46, 88 At. 963,
followed by the principal case. But it is doubted whether the absurdity excori-
ated in the opinions exists in fact. Classifications have been sustained on the
ground of facilitating administration. Missouri v. Lewis (1879) ioi U. S. 22;
25 L. Ed. 989. Certainly the administrative machinery for dealing with
inmates of public institutions is the easiest both to create and to run effectively.
It may fairly be urged, too, that the worst cases are most likely to be found in
the institutions; and perhaps that the state has greater, more immediate respon-
sibility for defectives thrown directly into the state's hands for care and
restraint. And it is an unfortunate fact that "once an inmate, always an
inmate"--i. e., always under restraint from procreation, is no rule of our
institutions. It is believed that any fair investigation of the facts will show-
Garrison, J., to the contrary notwithstanding, in Smith v. Board of Examiners,
supra, at p. 55-that the insufficiency of institutional accommodation to meet the
demand does result not only in the turning away from, but in the turning out
of the institutions of many uncured and incurable defectives, to make room for
more. Surely a law which secures the sterilization of such, while they are
under control, before they are lost in the community, is far from showing that
flat-footed unreasonableness in its classification which the courts have said is
necessary to make them refuse enforcement. See Booth v. Illinois (1902) 184
U. S. 425, 22 Sup. Ct. 45.
CONTRACrS-ILLEGAITY-OUSTING CoutrT's JunRSDIcrioN.-An article in a bill
of lading for maritime shipment from Bordeaux to New York provided that
"all litigation arising from the interpretation of the execution of the present bill
of lading shall be judged according to French law and by the court of the
place indicated on the bill of lading, which court the shippers and the claimants
formally declare they accept as competent." A libel was brought in the District
Court for the Southern District of New York to recover for short delivery.
Held, that "the provision . . . by which the Bordeaux court was made 
the
sole forum must be construed as void in this jurisdiction." Kuhnhold v. Com-
pagnie G~nerale Transatlantique (i918, S.'D. N. Y.) 251 Fed. 387.
Our courts have been liberal in allowing parties to govern their contract by
the system of law of their own choice. Whether the law by which the contract
is held governed be that of the place of making, of the place of performance,
of the flag, or that which will sustain the cotitract, the intention of the parties
is very generally made the basis of the court's decision as to which law governs.
Home Land & Cattle Co. v. McNamara (i9o6, C. C. A. 7th) 145 Fed. i7;
Lloyd v. Guibert (i865, Ex. Ch.) L. IL i Q. B. 115; Pritchard v. Norton (1882)
io6 U. S. 124, i Sup. Ct. 1o2. Now it seems evident that when a particular
system is expressly chosen, the parties' intention can hardly be realized unless
the court where suit is brought can adequately interpret the law of the chosen
system. And it seems evident that the court best qualified to interpret accurately
is a court of the country whose law is chosen to govern. Hence arise such con-
tract provisions as that in the principal case-which, being valid by the law of
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France and Germany-can hardly be wholly unreasonable. See Lorenzen, Cases
on Confl. L., 3g4 n. Our courts, however, have been jealous of any attempt
to "oust their jurisdiction." The law is settled that a provision which attempts
to fix as the sole forum another court in a domestic or in a foreign common
law jurisdiction, will be disregarded by the court where suit is brought. Prince
Steam Shipping Co. v. Lehman (x889, S. D. N. Y.) 39 Fed. 704; Slocum v.
Western Assurance Co. (i89o, S. D. N.-Y.) 42 Fed. 235; authorities collected
(1908) 8 COLUMBIA L. REv. 409. The chief consideration of policy in the earlier
cases-which the later seem to follow without over-much consideration-seems
to be a fear that the defendants may use such clauses to dodge, with persons
and property, out of the chosen jurisdiction and so out of all liability. It may
fairly be questioned whether this objection might not be met by holding such
fraudulent removal, if proved in another jurisdiction, to waive compliance with
that term of the contract; as is done, e. g., in the case of fraudulent remaval
to prevent notice of dishonor. Cf. Williams v. Bank of the United States (1829,
U. S.) 2 Pet. 96. And it may be questioned, in any case, whether the injustice
done plaintiffs in general by having their debtors skip the jurisdiction of the
chosen forum is, over and after all, greater than the injustice done defendants
by having suits slapped upon them, when unsuspecting and far from home, with-
out adequate means of defence at hand. But when the foreign jurisdiction
chosen by the parties is one of the civil law, an additional reason appears for
sustaining the provision. New York may well be able to very fairly read the
law of Massachusetts. Cf. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. (1918, N. Y.) 12o N. E.
i98, (1918) 28 YALE LAW JO RNAL, 67. Even in such cases difficulty is not
unknown. But experience shows common law courts to-be in the main utterly
unable to fairly read and pass on the law of a civil law country. Cf. Lando v.
Lando (igio) I2 Minn. 257, 127 N. W. I125; In re Johnson [i9o3] I Ch.
821; Bremer v. Freeman (1857, P. C.) io Moo. P. C. 3o6. This is not strange;
and the inability is mutual; the systems are too unlike in matter and method.
To get the benefit of the provision, therefore, which the courts claim to be ready
to allow,-viz., choice by the parties of the governing law-the provision for
determination of civil law in a civil law court should be respected. And doubly
strong is this argument before a court of admiralty, where it has repeatedly
been stated that under special circumstances the court will decline to exercise
a jurisdiction which they undoubtedly possess, when justice appears much better
obtainable by suit in a home port. See The Belgenland (1884) 114 U. S. 355,
366, 367. And common law courts have acted on a similar principle. Mittenthal
v. Mascagni (i9o3) 183 Mass. ig, 66 N. E. 425. It is submitted that the facts
of the present case, in the absence of fraud, might without straining be held
to constitute such special circumstances. And the urging of such considerations
is, it is further submitted, not untimely or unreasonable in view of the present
tendency of our courts to forego their ancient fierce jealousy of letting any
controversy escape their determination. The common law no longer nurses its
feud against the courts of chancery and admiralty. Arbitration clauses, so long
held void for this same reason of ousting jurisdiction, have been made legal in
England by statute. Our own courts have been growing restive under the out-
worn rule of their illegality. See Delaware Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania Coal Co.
(1872) 5o N. Y. 25o, 258-9; United States ;4sphalt Co. v. Trinidad Lake Co.
(1915, S. D. N. Y.) = Fed. ioo6. It is believed that the case for respecting
clauses such as that in the principal case is stronger than that for respecting a
clause of arbitration. Indeed, as regards causes of action already existent at the
time of the agreement, a contract to sue only in a foreign forum has already
found recognition by the forum of attempted suit declining jurisdiction. Gitler
v. Russian Co. (i9o8, N. Y.) 124 App. Div. 273, zo8 N. Y. Supp. 793. Nor, in
view of the above, is the reason clear which distinguishes against the future
cause of action.
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CONtDRACTS-INNOCENT MISREPRESENTATIoN-DEFENSE To ACTION AT LAw.-In
an action for damages for breach of contract it was shown that in making the
promise to buy certain corporate stocks and bonds the defendant relied, at least
in part, upon an innocent misrepresentation made by the plaintiff. The sale of
the securities was "the means by which to convey land with a factory and
machinery"; the untrue representation was that "a right of way, which was a
substantial factor of value in the real estate, was owned by the corporation."
Held, that the innocent misrepresentation was a defense to the action. Bates v.
Cashman (i918, Mass.) iig N. E. 663.
See COMMENTS, p. x78.
GUARDIAN AND WARD-PURCHASE BY GUARDIAN FOR HIMSELF-RIGHT OF WARD
TO AccE r BENEFr.-Minor children owned real property in fee, subject to an
unadmeasured dower interest of their mother. The plaintiff, who was the
guardian of the children, purchased for himself the dower interest of the mother,
receiving a quitclaim deed. Later the mother executed a quitclaim deed purport-
ing to release the dower interest to the children. The latter, through a new
guardian, brought ejectment against the plaintiff, who was in possession; where-
upon he filed a bill in equity to restrain the ejectment suit, to have the dower
admeasured and the widow compelled to convey to him the lands so set off,
and to have the deed to the children declared void. Held, that the children were
entitled in equity, through their present guardian, to elect to accept the benefits
of the purchase by the first guardian, but that if they so elected, their estate must
account to the plaintiff for the purchase price paid the mother. Ostrander C. J.,
and Bird, J., dissenting in part. Johnston v. Loose (i918, Mich.) 167 N. W.
IO21.
The plaintiff based his claim to the dower interest on the fact that the
statutes of Michigan relating to guardians merely forbade them to purchase
the interests of the wards when offered at public or official sales and did not
cover the case of a distinct interest-in the same physical object, to be sure-
vested in some other person. The majority of the court replied that while the
statutes did not cover the case, the general principles of the law of trusts as
established by judicial decision forbade a fiduciary of any kind to derive a bene-
fit of the sort which the plaintiff attempted to acquire in the principal case. This
position is fully justified both by English and American precedents. The prin-
ciple has been recognized for about 25o years; the leading case is Keech v. Sand-
ford (1726) Sel. Ch. Cas. 6i, known to English lawyers as the Rumford Market
Case. Some of the leading cases are: Holt v. Holt (1671) 1 Ch. Cas. Igo
(executor) ; Rushworth's Case (1676) 2 Free. 13 (mortgagee); Taster v. Mar-
riot (1768) Amb. 668 Ceasehold interest given to A for life, after his death to
B absolutely; A secures an extension of the lease-he is a trustee of the exten-
sion for B); Ex parte Lacey (18o2) 6 Ves. 625 (assignee in bankruptcy);
Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick (i8io) 17 Ves. 298 (one partner obtains secretly
a renewal of the lease of the partnership premises-he is trustee for the other
partners in proportion to their shares) ; Lees v. Nuttall (x829) I Rus. & M.
53 (agent); Smith v. Chichester (1842) i C. & L. 486 (mortgagor); Rose v.
Hayden (1886) 35 Kan. io6, IO Pic. 554 (agent); Rich v. Black (1896) 173
Pa. St. 92, 33 AtI. 88o (agent). While cases applying the rule to guardians are
not numerous, they are not totally lacking: Sparhazk v. Allen (I85o) 21 N. H.
9. A distinction has been taken in some of the cases between the rule applicable
to fiduciaries in the more strict sense of the term-trustees, executors, adminis-
trators, guardians, and agents-who are absolutely disqualified to take for their
own benefit, and that governing persons who are fiduciaries only in a broader
sense of the term-such as mortgagees, mortgagors, and partners-as to whom
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there is merely a "rebuttable presumption of fact" that they acquired the benefit
in question by an improper use of their position. See Walter G. Hart, The
Development of the Rule in Keech v. Sandford, in (i9o5) 21 L Qu AT. REv. 258.
It should be added that Ostrander, C. J., disagreed with the majority only upon
the question whether the estate of the children should reimburse the plaintiff
for his outlay. While doubtless the children had by their mother's release
acquired the complete fee simple at law to the land-her prior conveyance to the
plaintiff having given him at most an equitable claim-in equity that does not
determine who is entitled, and the view of the majority seems clearly right.
INSURANcE-CoNsTRUcTION OF PoLtcy-"GAs ACCIDENTALLY ABSORBED OR
INHALE."--The insured held in a mutual association an accident certificate
which provided that there should be no liability for accidental death "from
. . . gases or anything accidentally or otherwise taken, administered,
absorbed . . . or inhaled." While asleep in a hotel room, the insured was
asphyxiated by escaping gas. Held, (two judges dissenting) that the defendant
association was not liable. Jones v. Hawkeye Com'l Men's Assn. (i9x8, Iowa)
168 N. W. 305.
The decision is confessedly made in the teeth of cogent authority to the
contrary, which is well reviewed in the dissenting opinion of Weaver, J. The
latter argues strongly that similar words of the exception have been repeatedly
construed by courts of last resort not to include the present case; that such
decisions should control, or if not, they should at least create a doubt as to the
meaning of the exception; and that doubts should for obvious reasons be uni-
formly resolved in favor of the insured. Further, that when the insurer, as
in the present case, qualifies the broad terms of an exemption clause, he is
bound rigidly to the strictest limits of his expressed qualifications. Thus an
exception of death by poison "in any way taken, administered, absorbed or
inhaled" was held not to cover death from chloral taken by mistake for
distilled water. Metropolitan Accident Assn. v. Froiland (1876) 16i IlL. 30, 43
N. E. 766; but cf. Porter v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co. (igo5, N. Y.) iog App.
Div. io3, 95 N. Y. Supp. 682 ("voluntary and involuntary inhalation" ield to
cover asphyxiation while asleep). "Had it been intended to exclude all liability
for death by poison, a simple statement to that effect would have" sufficed.
Thus far the dissent. On the other hand, when the company does not qualify
broad language, the courts have been very ready to construct expansive restric-
tions of their own. Accident Ins. Co. of N. A. v. Crandall (i887) I2o U. S.
527, 7 Sup. Ct. 685 ("self-inflicted injuries" and "suicide" held not to cover
death of insured by own hand while temporarily insane); and see Northwestern
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hazelett (i886) io5 Ind. 213, 4 N. E. 582. The dilemma
of the company in drawing a policy is apparent. Granted that it is desirable to
prevent insurance companies from including in policies exceptions which defeat
the reasonable expectations of the unwary insured; should this be done by
affixing to words meanings quite at variance with and almost unrelated to their
meaning in ordinary life? The courts have so done in this line of cases; and
this same Iowa court has participated. Riley v. Interstate Bus. Men's Acc. Assns.
(x916) i77 Iowa 449, i59 N. W. 203. Such action produces the dilemma of the
court in the principal case. The majority claim, with full justice, that if the
words here used do not except the accident which here occurred, no words in
our language can except it. If the contract were between ordinary mortals,
this would seem, the only sane decision. For in contracting men use words as
they are used in the world of men, and not as they have been construed by
courts in a technical attempt to defeat an equally technical and unfair advantage
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obtained by one of the parties. Where the contract is a technical one drawn
by technicians it is doubtless more reasonable to hold them to the meaning 
of
their terms as laid down by the courts. Cf. Devine v. Devine (i918, N. 
J. Ch.)
104 Atl. 370. Even then, it may become advisable to avoid 
absurdity by allowing
language to carry the sense its words cry for. The action of the 
court in the
instant case is bQld. The authorities seem in sense and in law unsound. 
They
are based on conscious or unconscious rebellion against letting 
an insured be
tricked out of benefits which the courts believe he was justified in 
expecting.
The court here disregards them;' it refuses to let a hard case make 
bad law-
in the hope that the legislature will act.
TAXATION-INHERITANCE TAXEs-DEDucrION OF FEDERAL 
ESTATE TAX BFxoRo
ASSESSING STATE INHuERITANCE TAx.-A resident of New Jersey died 
testate
leaving an estate upon which the federal estate tax was more than $i,oooooo.
The question arose whether this sum should-be deducted from the appraisement
of the estate in computing the state inheritance tax. Held, that the federal 
tax
was to be deducted from the value of the estate in ascertaiing for the 
purposes
of state taxation "the clear market value of the property transferred." 
In re
Roebling's Estate (I9i8, N. J. Prerog.) IO4 AtL 295.
A resident of Illinois died testate leaving an estate upon which a federal
estate tax was assessed. Held, that in computing the state inheritance tax 
the
federal tax was to be deducted as an expense of administration from 
the gross
value of the decedent's property. People v. Pasfield (I918, Ill.) 12o N. 
E. 286.
The important question raised by these cases has already been passed 
upon
in several states and is certain to arise in others. In Minnesota and Connecticut
the deduction has been allowed. State v. Probate Court of Hennepin County
(i918, Minn.) "i66 N. W. 125; Corbin v. Townshend (i918) 92 Conn. 501, 103
Atl. 647. In New York the deduction has been denied. In re Sherman's 
Estate
(i917) i79 App. Div. 497, 166 N. Y. Supp. ig; affirmed 
without opinion in
ii8 N. E. io78. For a discussion of the relative merits of the two views,
approving the former, see (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, io55. In the 
principal
cases the nature of the federal estate tax is considered at length. The 
opinions
point out that it resembles the old English probate duty and is a charge 
against
the estate of the 'lecedent, not a charge against the beneficial shares 
of the
several legatees or distributees of the decedent. The constitutionality 
of such
a tax is considered and affirmed in the Illinois case. State inheritance taxes, 
on
the other hand, are commonly based upon the privilege of the beneficiaries 
to
receive the decedent's property by will or intestate succession, and are 
measured
by the value of the property so passing to them. Hence a probate duty 
charge-
able against the decedent's estate is properly deducted, like debts and 
expenses
of administration. This would seem to be clearly true in respect to the Illinois
inheritance tax. It is not quite so obvious in the case of the New Jersey 
tax
because the courts have construed that tax, at least in the case of non-resident
decedents, as being a tax upon the transfer to the executor or administrator,
not as a legacy tax on the succession of the beneficiaries. See (x918) 27 
YALE
LAW JouRNAI, io55, at 1059. It is interesting to note that under the New 
York
view the federal tax is ultimately deducted pro rata from the several legacies
instead of being treated as an expense of administration deducible 
from the
residuary estate. In re Douglass' Estate (I9r8, Surr.) i7i N. Y. 
Supp. 956.
ToRns--THREAENED PHYsIcAL INjURY o LAND-No REcovERY FOR DEPRECIA-
TION IN MARKET VALIU--The defendant corporation placed upon 
its own land
a large pile of "strippings" (soft earth, quicksand and gravel) 
from a mine.
RECENT CASE NOTES
The ground on which the pile was placed sloped toward neighboring houses,
one of which was that of the plaintiff. A portion of the material suddenly
gushed out from the bottom of the pile, crossed the highway and carried away
seyviral of the houses for a distance of about fifty feet, but the plaintiff's property
was not touched. The plaintiff claimed damages because the existence of the
pile near his premises, with the danger of a recurrence of the slide, had sub-
stantially diminished their market value. He recovered a judgment in the court
below. Held, that the judgment was erroneous, since the plaintiff had no cause
of action until physical injury to his property occurs. Johnson v. Rouchleau-
Ray Iron Land Co. (1p18, Minn.) 168 N. W. I.
See COMMENTS, p. 171.
TRovER AND CONvERSIoN-LIABIITY OF INNOCENT AGENT-TRANSFER OF NEGOT-
ABLE PAPEm-Negotiable instruments payable to bearer were stolen from the
plaintiff. An agent of the thief delivered them to the defendants, who were
bankers, and authorized their sale. The defendants sold them and after deduct-
ing their commission paid the proceeds to the agent, who paid them over to his
principal. Throughout the transaction the defendants acted without notice,
actual or "constructive," of the plaintiff's interest. The plaintiff brought an
action for conversion. Held, that the acts of the defendants did not amount to
a conversion. Pratt v. Higginson (x18, Mass.) ug N. F_ 66r.
See COMMENTS, p. 175.
TRUSTS-RESULTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTs-GRANTEE'S ORAL AGREEMENT
To HOLD LAND FOR PERSON PAYING PURCHASE PRIcE.-The complainant's bill
alleged that he paid the purchase price of certain real estate, the title to which
was conveyed to the defendant, and that the latter expressly agreed and declared
that she held the property in trust for him. Held, that the plaintiff had no
enforceable equitable interest in the property. Keown v. Keourn (1918, Mass.)
II9 N. E. 785.
The decision follows previous Massachusetts cases in seeing nothing but the
express oral trust, the enforcement of which is forbidden by the statute of
frauds. The English law and that of some American states is to the contrary,
taking the view that there is a "resulting trust" in favor of the buyer. Dyer v.
Dyer (1788, Ex.) 2 Cox, 92; Stock v. McAvoy (1872) L. R. 15 Eq. 55; Cook
v. Patrick (i891) 135 Ill. 499, 26 N. E. 658. As the cases just cited show, this
so-called "resultingtrust" is based upon a presumption of fact, "rebuttable"
by evidence. Cf. (I918) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 7o5. The result is that in the
end, where evidence is introduced, it is really the express oral trust which is
enforced. This seems clearly to violate the statute of frauds, and to this extent
the Massachusett view seems sound. There is, however, another possibility
which is usually entirely overlooked by -the courts. In other parts of our law
we have acted upon the general principle that, while one may set up the statute
of frauds as an excuse for refusing to perform the obligations resulting from
an express oral promise, if he does so he will not be permitted to enrich himself
thereby in an unjust way. In consequence he is usually required to restore,
either specifically or by way of money equivalent, that which he received in
consideration for the oral 'Promise. Keener, Quasi-contracts, 277; Woodward,
Quasi-contracts, 147. It happens occasionally under this doctrine that the plain-
tiff actually obtains the same relief that he would have been entitled to had the
oral promise been enforceable, but this is merely a coincidence and no reason
for refusing to apply the general principle. Thus, if services are performed
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under an agreement within the statute of frauds, the one performing them may
recover their reasonable value in a quasi-contractual action. In some jurisdic-
tions the agreed price may be used as evidence of the value of the, services.
Scarisbrick v. Parkinson (i869, Ex.) 20 L. T. N. S. 175; Keener, op. cit., 290;
contra, Hillebrands v. Nibbelink (i879) 40 Mich. 646. If the jury find the
reasonable value to be the contract price-as is not infrequently the case-no
one imagines that the contractual rather than the quasi-contractual duty is 
being
enforced. Obviously this general principle applies to situations like that 
in the
principal case. It is unconscionable that one who has paid nothing and 
who
has acquired property upon an express oral agreement to hold it for others
should be allowed both to break his promise and to keep the property. To
compel surrender of the latter is not to enforce the express oral trust, for non
constat that the terms of the oral trust are identical with the constructive
obligation to convey to the one paying the purchase price. In some cases they
would be, in others not. In any event, if they were identical, it would be a
mere dramatic coincidence. In many states there are statutes which affect the
matter. These are collected and discussed, together with the cases, in Ames,
Lectures on Legal History, 431-434. Cf. also the Comment upon Constructive
Trusts Arising upon Breach of Express Oral Trusts of Land (z918) 27 YALE
LAw JoRNAT. 389, also CURRENT DEclSiONS, infra.
WILLs-CoNsTRutioN-LEGAcY TO "CHILD" oF TEsTAToaes SoN noEs NOT
INcLUDE ADoPTrD CHrnz.-The testator was survived by his son, S, who was
married but without children. The will gave a legacy, upon the death of S,
"to his child or children and their heirs," with a gift over to residuary legatees
in case S left no child. After the testator's death S legally adopted a child.
Held, that the legacy belonged to the residuary legatees. In re Puterbaugh's
Estate (I918, Pa.) io4 At. 6oi.
It would seem that the court was justified under the circumstances in ascribing
to the word "child" its primary and popular meaning. See Lichter v. Thiers
(I9o9) 139 Wis. 481, 121 N. W. 153. Had the adoption been prior to the
testator's death, the adopted child might in some circumstances have been con-
strued as intended by the testator to be included within a legacy to "children."
In re Truman (i9o5) 27 R. L 2o9, 6i At1. 598. An adopted child has been
permitted to take under a devise to the "heirs at law" of the testator's daughter,
even though the statute for adoption was enacted after the testator's death.
Smith v. Hunter (1912) 86 Oh. St. xo6, 99 N. E. 91. But the weight of authority
is believed to be contra, Wyeth v. Stone (1887) 144 Mass. 441, II N. E. 729;
Brown v. Wright (igo7.) i94 Mass. 54o, 8o N. E. 612. Similarly, under statutes
which avoid the lapsing of a legacy to a relative of the testator, when the legatee
dies before the latter, there is a conflict of authority whether an adopted child
can take the legacy given to his foster parent and so prevent the lapse. Phillips
v. McConicea (i898) 59 Oh. St. I, 51 N. E. 445 (holding he does not); Warren v.
Prescott (1892) 84 Me. 483, 24 Atl. 48 (holding he does).
